ACI research finds that Nepal has made progress in distributing public funds across its provinces but has struggled to turn these allocations into stronger development outcomes. Gaps in provincial capacity continue to hinder infrastructure development, improvements in the business environment, and public financial accountability. Following Nepal’s Gen Z protests, that gap has become a defining test of whether federalism can meet demands for better jobs, services and transparent government.
Under the three-tier system established by the 2015 Constitution, federal transfers are designed to help provinces with unequal revenue bases meet their development needs. Yet across all seven provinces, fiscal records from FY2018/19 through FY2024/25 show that while equalisation grants support disadvantaged regions, most provinces raise less than 10% of their revenue internally. This leaves them overwhelmingly dependent on federal funding and weakens the local link between taxation and accountability.
Greater access to funds has also failed to guarantee execution. In 2021, provincial governments left nearly one-fifth of their budgets unspent, underscoring chronic difficulties in converting allocated money into physical investments. In infrastructure-poor regions such as Karnali and Sudurpashchim, capital projects stall due to limited technical capacity, sluggish procurement and land acquisition hurdles. Consequently, budgets sit idle even where infrastructure deficits are acute, hindering connectivity and regional competitiveness.
Funding volatility further compounds the problem. Conditional, special and complementary grants fluctuate with federal priorities and fiscal pressures, making it difficult for provinces to plan long-term projects. Provinces may consequently end up spending according to the conditions attached to federal grants, rather than directing resources towards their own development priorities.
Building a more autonomous revenue base is therefore central to reform. Key priorities include expanding constitutionally permitted provincial tax powers—such as granting greater discretion over specific tax rates and surcharges—and diversifying revenue beyond vehicle taxes. Stronger own-source revenue would reduce reliance on federal transfers and reinforce local oversight. Establishing three-year indicative grant ceilings would also provide the fiscal predictability required for multi-year capital investment.
Financial accountability remains another major challenge. In FY2023/24, audit irregularities accounted for 2.53% of audited spending in Madhesh, compared with 1.03% in Bagmati. While these figures often involve unsettled advances rather than outright corruption, persistent irregularities, slow audit follow-up and opaque expenditure records undermine financial oversight and erode public trust.
Addressing these issues requires linking a modest share of federal grants to measurable progress in project execution, audit compliance and transparency, while carefully safeguarding baseline equalisation funds for poorer provinces. Targeted technical support for project preparation and procurement is equally vital to ensure disadvantaged regions are not penalised for limited administrative capacity. Furthermore, in direct response to demands raised during the Gen Z protests, capital spending should pivot decisively toward youth skills, job creation, innovation and digital infrastructure.
Overall, Nepal’s next phase of fiscal federalism should measure success by development outcomes rather than transfer volumes alone. Combining predictable funding and broader provincial tax powers with stronger procurement capacity and transparent audit follow-up can help preserve fiscal equity while creating economic opportunities and strengthening public accountability.
By LU, Weilin
Researchers: MAHAT, Jaya Jung, BAJRACHARYA, Juria Sato, DHUNGEL, Nischal, WAGLE, Pradhyumna, RAYAMAJHI, Siddhartha
